‘We Are the Middle Class’ The New Turkish Middle Class: Identification, Behaviors and Expectations by Combarnous, François et al.
HAL Id: halshs-02421481
https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-02421481
Submitted on 6 Feb 2020
HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access
archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci-
entific research documents, whether they are pub-
lished or not. The documents may come from
teaching and research institutions in France or
abroad, or from public or private research centers.
L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est
destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents
scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non,
émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de
recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires
publics ou privés.
‘We Are the Middle Class’ The New Turkish Middle
Class: Identification, Behaviors and Expectations
François Combarnous, Jean-Philippe Berrou, Matthieu Clément, Dominique
Darbon, Eric Rougier
To cite this version:
François Combarnous, Jean-Philippe Berrou, Matthieu Clément, Dominique Darbon, Eric Rougier.
‘We Are the Middle Class’ The New Turkish Middle Class: Identification, Behaviors and Expectations.
Turkish Economic Review, Ksp Journals, 2019, 6 (3), pp.158-184. ￿halshs-02421481￿
Turkish Economic Review 
www.kspjournals.org 
Volume 6                     September 2019                         Issue 3 
 
‘We are (the) Middle Class’ 
The new Turkish middle class: identification, 
behaviors and expectations 
 
By François COMBARNOUSaa† 
Jean-Philippe BERROU b, Matthieu CLEMENT c, 
Dominique DARBON d & Éric ROUGIER e 
 
Abstract. This article aims to identify and characterise the Turkish middle class. Our 
objective is to improve its description by implementing a clustering method combining an 
economic and a sociological approach. Using the Income and Living Conditions Survey 
(2014), we first identify the middle-class on the basis of an income interval. We then use 
information about employment and education to characterise the heterogeneity of this 
middle-income class. The distinctive behaviors and aspirations of four middle class groups 
are explored in depth by using the results of original qualitative field research carried out 
among middle class households from two contrasting regions.  
Keywords. Social stratification, Income distribution, Middle class, Turkey, Clustering 
methods. 
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1. Introduction 
he growth and sustainability of the ‘middle classes’ are important 
stages in the development nations. Because demand from them 
contributes to the expansion and scaling up of the domestic market, 
they contribute to GDP growth (Matsuyama, 2002; Banerjee & Duflo, 2008). 
Socially, their emergence breaks the dualism and antagonism between a 
vast mass of poor people and a small elite that holds wealth and power.It 
also reveals the potential for upward mobility between strata of society. 
This expansion is therefore expected to contribute to the construction of 
national consensus, to political stability and, by extension, to the 
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strengthening and generalization of democratic aspirations (Lipset, 1959; 
Easterly, 2001; Loayza et al., 2012). 
Yet this ‘middle class’ is a transdisciplinary concept whose use and 
definition remain largely controversial. From the income-based economic 
approach to the sociological approach based on social status, from the 
subjective approach based on class consciousness to the managerial 
approach based on consumer habits, the term is often used in an imprecise 
and sometimes confused manner. 
The scientific community’s growing interest in the role of the middle 
class in economic development as much as the country's recent economic, 
political and social history has raised interesting discussions of the subject 
in relation to Turkey. The topic has been discussed from different 
perspectives showing that Turkish middle class has both secular and 
conservative elements, is well-educated, emerged after the 80s for its most 
conservative part and adopts free market values (see for instance Balkan & 
Oncü 2014; Keyman, 2012; Kravets & Sandikci, 2014; Öncü & Balkan, 2016; 
Rutz & Balkan, 2010; Uner & Güngördü, 2016; Şimşek, 2005; Yılmaz, 2007). 
But the concept of middle class has been rarely considered in a 
multidimensional way in that literature. This paper aims to identify and 
characterize the Turkish middle class(es) from a multidimensional 
perspective, then analyze their behaviors and aspirations. 
Even if the term ‘middle class’ is very often used in today's Turkey, the 
phenomenon remains rather vague. In the big cities, the profound 
transformations in Turkey’s economic and social structure since the 
beginning of the 1980s have led to the emergence of a highly educated 
population, working in the tertiary sector, integrated into global networks 
and tending to distinguish itself through new consumerbehavior. This 
emerging population was the first tobecome known in Turkey as the ‘new 
middle class’ and it has become a particularly popular subject of study in 
social science literature. The more recent period, however, has seen the 
emergence of another very different social group, in turn called a ‘new 
middle class’, made up of a new conservative bourgeoisie that formed after 
the AKP (President Erdoğan’s Justice and Development Party) came to 
power. Tosummarize, the expression ‘middle classes’ seems to cover very 
contrasting realities that it is important to study. 
In Turkey, the term ‘middle class’ refers to a social category that has 
long been neglected or misapplied or highly politicized. The historian 
Feroz Ahmad (2009) shows that both before and after the foundation of the 
Turkish Republic, successive regimes wished to promote the rise of a 
‘Turkish bourgeoisie’. The first studies on the middle class as such date 
back to the 1990s. They examined the impact of the great changes that have 
taken place in the transition to the export-oriented market economy in the 
period of T. Özal (Kozanoğlu, 1992) and the ‘cultural war’ between social 
groups whose socio-economic status has consequently risen or collapsed 
(Gürbilek, 1999; Öncü, 1999; Bali, 2002 and Şimşek, 2005). More work was 
thereafter undertaken to examine other dimensions of the phenomenon, 
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such as the quantitative extension of the groups designated as ‘middle 
classes’ and the internal differentiations of this group. Some focus on the 
issues of status, income and cultural and consumer practices of the middle 
class and their becoming political actors in their own right, mainly 
following the events of Gezi in 2013 (Yörük, 2014; Keyder, 2013, Saraçoğlu, 
2014, Gürcan & Peker, 2015, Yörük & Yüksel, 2015)1. From a more Marxist 
viewpoint, other work deals with the precariousness and downgrading of 
the middle class as a result of recent liberal transformations in the country 
(Kurtuluş, 2012). 
Thus, the basic idea is that the Turkish middle class should be much 
more understood as a flow of individuals than as a stock of households. 
This explains, among other things, the difficulty in identifying its profile, as 
well as the strong differentiation between this type of middle class and 
those established in the industrialized countries for which it was more 
feasible to reason in terms of stock. Nevertheless, the Turkish political, 
economic and social landscape has undergone considerable change in 
recent years, prompting us to reconsider what has become of the middle 
classes in today's Turkey and to question their homogeneity, behaviors and 
aspirations. 
In this paper, the identification of the middle classes will be based on 
SILC (Survey on Income and Life Conditions) data collected by Turkstat 
(the Turkish Statistical Institute). The baseline year is 2014 and the survey 
covers approximately 23,000 households. Our goal is to reveal their 
potential heterogeneity and describe their main socio-economic 
characteristics. To do this, a sequential method has been adopted, 
combining an economic approach (based on income) and a sociological 
approach (mobilizing information on employment and education). The 
idea is, first of all, to delimit a middle class on the basis of income. It is not 
a question of precisely identifying the size of the middle class (given the 
lack of an international consensus on the choice of the monetary range), but 
rather delimiting a set of individuals located in the middle of the Turkish 
income distribution (i.e. a ‘middle-income set’). The second stage consists 
of mobilizing more qualitative information on employment and education 
in order to identify the different components of the ‘middle class’ set 
defined in the previous step. This is to highlight the potential heterogeneity 
of the ‘monetarily-defined’ middle class. This second step involves a mixed 
classification procedure that is applied to the middle class defined in the 
previous step. The variables then considered describe the level of 
education, the socio-professional category, the status in employment, the 
type of employer (or the institutional sector) and the possible multi-activity 
of the household head. The groups identified can then be characterized 
from complementary socio-economic variables. Finally, these quantitative 
results are supplemented by a systematic analysis of the behaviors, 
aspirations and expectations of the Turkish middle class. To this end, 
twenty-five semi-structured qualitative interviews were conducted on the 
basis of a questionnaire adapted to the specificities of the Turkish situation 
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and to a population chosen to cover all the different middle classes 
‘revealed’ by the quantitative analysis. For this stage, households were 
surveyed in 2017 in Istanbul and Gaziantep, in order to capture as well as 
possible, and from two very different areas of the country, the diversity 
identified in the middle-income class during the previous stage. 
The paper is structured as follows. The next section contextualizes the 
analysis and reviews the literature on the identification and definition of 
the Turkish middle class. The third section describes the statistical 
methodology and the data and comments on the results of our clustering 
process. The fourth section explores the distinctive behaviors and 
aspirations of the previously identified groups by using the results of our 
original, qualitative field research. Finally, the fifth section concludes in 
dealing with the specific characteristics and internal differentiation of the 
Turkish middle class. 
 
2. The middle class in Turkey: contextualization, 
emergence and characteristics in the literature 
2.1. Economic context 
In October 2017, Turkey officially had nearly 80 million inhabitants, to 
which must be added three million Syrian refugees. The country is on track 
to complete its demographic transition and align with ‘western’ 
demographic behaviors, particularly in urban areas. The country is now 
officially more than 90% urbanized, even if the urban ‘ambiances’ are very 
different, ranging from small and medium-sized towns – whose middle 
class is reduced to a few officials and entrepreneurs – to the largest cities 
characterized by more visible and diversified middle classes. The urban / 
rural divide is clear in Turkey. It results from development policies that are 
too focused on the cities to the detriment of small towns. It finds its clearest 
expression in the considerable importance of Istanbul, which not only 
concentrates consumption, but also culture and the private media. This 
contributes to a division of the population into isolated subsets, despite the 
dynamic of socio-economic climbing fueled by a common belief in 
promotion through education. While the tradition of the centralized state 
has existed since the beginning of the Turkish Republic, since the 1990s 
there has been a renewal of the elites and coalitions of interests that govern 
the country. A conservative bourgeoisie, which does not subscribe entirely 
to the founding values of the Republic, has taken control of the state 
apparatus and part of the economy. The purges that took place in the 
aftermath of the failed coup of the night of July 15-16 2016 struck part of 
this new bourgeoisie but did not call into question the changeover that led 
to the emergence of new entrepreneurial classes, produced by urbanization, 
rising educational and living standards, rising domestic consumption and 
opening up of the economy through exports. 
During the 1990s, the Turkish economy was characterized by very 
unstable growth, mainly due to high, chronic inflation. This led to very 
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high real interest rates that in turn indirectly led to a worsening of public 
debt leading to the crisis of the late 1990s. According to Gursel et al. (2011), 
the major crisis of 1999-2001 hit the Turkish economy hard, but at the same 
time, it forced officials to turn their backs on questionable practices so that, 
surprisingly, emergence from the crisis turned out to be relatively rapid. It 
was centered on (i) the reform and consolidation of the banking system, (ii) 
the independence of the Central Bank and (iii) massive support from the 
IMF in return for a stabilization plan and strong fiscal discipline. Thus, 
under constraint from the IMF, the policy mix adopted helped to stop 
budgetary slippage and put the Turkish economy back on the path to 
growth within a more tightly-controlled budgetary and monetary 
framework (Gursel et al., 2011). 
Turkey was then able to benefit from a strong growth regime (+ 7 to + 
8% per year) which continued until mid-2006. This growth was mainly 
supported by domestic consumption and private investment. This 
favorable period ended in May 2006 when a sharp depreciation of the 
Turkish Lira triggered an inflationary spiral that moved the Turkish 
economy into a weaker growth regime. The sharp contraction in growth in 
2008 and 2009, however, has been followed by a very strong recovery since 
2010. 
In their study of the diversity of emerging capitalist systems, Rougier & 
Combarnous (2017) classify Turkey in the group of countries that have a 
model of ‘statist resource-dependent capitalism’. In this, Turkish capitalism 
is distinguished from others by a strong dependence on natural resources 
and traditional agriculture and by significant public regulation of labor, 
finance and the productive sector tending to rigidify and segment markets. 
The authors consider that, within this group, Turkey joins a large number 
of the major emerging countries that have historically inherited high levels 
of state interventionism (Algeria, China, Egypt, India, Iran, Mexico, 
Pakistan, Russia). 
 
2.2. Social stratification and the middle classes in Turkey 
The history of social stratification in Turkey provides a better 
understanding of the rather special status of the middle classes in this 
country. According to Mardin (1967), the Ottoman social structure was 
fundamentally based on the distinction between rulers (askeri) and ruled 
(reaya). This structure lacks a state-independent bourgeoisie. In the author’s 
opinion, the Ottoman-Turkish modernization process involved the 
transformation of a tribal society into a class-based society. But in this 
process, the State's role as arbiter prevented the emergence and 
development of a state-independent bourgeoisie. The bureaucratic elite 
present at the end of the Ottoman Empire as well as that of the Republican 
period wanted on the one hand to create a ‘national bourgeoisie’ (or a new 
middle class), but on the other hand constituted a major obstacle to its 
independent emergence. This conflict between the bureaucratic elite and 
the entrepreneurial bourgeoisie is at the root of Turkey's social and political 
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structure. Karpat (2002) also argues that the state's refusal to remove the 
bureaucratic elite from its founding and modernizing role has always 
maintained its mistrust of the middle classes. This largely explains the fact 
that the Turkish middle class appeared rather late, and only in the shadow 
of the state. 
The various institutional studies that have recently focused on the 
middle class in Turkey (İGİAD, 2015; TUSİAD, 2014) based on public 
household budget data (TUİK, Turkish Statistical Institute) consider that 
the middle classes cover the three central quintiles of household income, 
excluding the poorest and the richest 20%. The share of income in this 
constant proportion of the 60% of households at the heart of the 
distribution increased from 44.8% in 2002 to 50.3% in 2007, then stabilized 
at 49% in 2011 (TÜSİAD, 2014, p.75). It has since tended to stagnate or even 
decline, following the successive repercussions of the US subprime crisis. 
Recent attempts to more fully consider the middle class by incorporating 
three basic criteria, not only of household income, but also of education and 
occupation (TÜAD, Turkish Researcher's Association: Socio-Economic Status 
(SES), 2012) has led to an estimate that the Turkish middle class represents 
just under 60% of households in the country. 
As in many other countries, the consumption of the Turkish middle class 
is characterized by a very strong demand for new technology, new 
entertainment and leisure, automobiles and housing2. However, it mainly 
differs from less advantaged classes in terms of education and health 
(TÜİK, 2016). The middle classes do not only want to stand out in terms of 
their lifestyle, they also want to mark their differences in the field of 
education and often prefer private schools for their children, the public 
education service being the preserve of the children of poor families. The 
same phenomenon is also noticeable in the field of health. Incidentally, of 
course, there is the question of how this considerable increase in the 
consumption of new products and services has been financed, since, as 
mentioned above, the income of the middle classes has not really increased 
over the last twenty years. The 2015 report of the Union of Turkish Banks 
(TBB, 2015) explains this phenomenon by the massive use of credit cards 
and bank loans. It seems that debt has been the essential driving force 
behind the development of ‘ostentatious’ consumption by the Turkish 
middle class in recent years. 
The various factions of the middle classes have been linked to different 
political parties or movements since the beginning of the twentieth century, 
depending on the economic and social transformations experienced by the 
country. Overall, the Turkish middle classes vote for center-left and center-
right parties (Yılmaz, 2007). Historically, the center-left People's Republican 
Party (CHP) is associated with the state, the republican ‘establishment’, and 
the urban, secular and highly educated middle-class attached to the ideals 
of Kemalism3. Yet other factions of the middle classes were represented 
during the twentieth century by a whole set of center-right parties 
following the tradition of the Democratic Party (PD). They are driven by 
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the success of the trading classes and rural landowners who oppose the 
allies of the state middle class and the industrial bourgeoisie. The reign of 
the Justice and Development Party (AKP), which began with its 
overwhelming victory in 2002, can be seen as a major disruption of existing 
structures. It was associated with the emergence of a new Islamic 
bourgeoisie that also included large factions of the middle classes that had 
previously supported center-right parties. Yılmaz (2007) argues that with 
the disappearance of the center-right parties, party politics is dominated by 
the conservative AKP and that the CHP has become more nationalist. In 
this context, there is no viable option for the secular middle classes, which 
means that they are undergoing a representation crisis. In short, it seems 
that the Turkish middle classes, rather than instituting or bringing about 
political change, vote globally for the political organizations that best 
guarantee and protect their interests, regardless of their political 
orientations. 
 
3. Quantitative identification and characterization of 
today’s Turkish middle class 
3.1. Methodology 
This study aims to identify the Turkish middle classes from household 
survey data, to reveal their potential heterogeneity and to describe their 
main socio-economic characteristics. The method that has been adopted 
broadly follows the approach used by Bonnefond et al., (2015) for China. 
This approach is multidimensional and sequential, combining an economic 
approach (based on income) and a sociological approach (mobilizing 
information on employment and education). It is not a question of precisely 
identifying a size of middle class (given the lack of consensus on the choice 
of the appropriate monetary range), but rather delimiting a set of 
individuals located in the middle of the income distribution (i.e. the 
‘middle-income set’). The second step consists of mobilizing more 
qualitative information on employment and education in order to identify 
the different components of the ‘middle class’ set defined in the previous 
step. This is to highlight the potential heterogeneity of the middle class. 
This multidimensional and sequential method of analysis can be broken 
down into two stages. First, the analysis of the income distribution in the 
country provides ‘guides’ for the choice of a relevant monetary range. The 
identification of the middle class from different monetary criteria informs 
the choice of a criterion that is both relevant and allows comparison 
between countries. Second, the implementation of a classification 
procedure based on variables related to education and employment within 
the middle class defined in the previous step allows the identification and 
characterization of clear-cut groups among the “monetarily-defined middle 
class”. Both steps are detailed below. 
3.1.1. First stage: income distribution analysis and identification of the middle 
class from different monetary criteria 
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The first step is to examine the income distribution in Turkey and 
compare it to a number of common thresholds. The income indicator used 
is monthly household income per capita, including all the usual income 
components (formal and informal earned income, wealth income, transfers, 
etc.). Most of the intervals used in the literature to identify the middle-
income classes are then tested. Indeed, most of the time, in the economic 
literature the middle class is statistically defined in terms of an income 
range within which the households or individuals that compose it are 
located. In general, several categories of approach may be distinguished. 
The relative approach is to define the middle class as the population in the 
middle of the income distribution. The relative intervals are most often 
based on median income (between 75% and 125% of median income), 
average income (between 1 and 2.5 times average income) or the national 
poverty line (between 2 and 5 times the poverty line). Relative criteria may 
also be based on quintiles (namely the three middle quintiles of the 
distribution). The absolute approach is primarily used for international 
comparisons. It is based on intervals expressed in PPP dollars (Purchasing 
Power Parity). Various intervals are constructed from a lower bound of $ 2 
per individual per day (in PPP). The underlying idea is to consider that the 
middle class starts where poverty ends. The following intervals appear in 
the literature: 2 $ -10 $, 2 $ -13 $ or 2 $ -20 $. As the Asian Development 
Bank acknowledges, households with per capita incomes between $ 2 and $ 
4 PPP per day remain highly vulnerable to a return to poverty in the event 
of socio-economic shocks and can hardly be considered as members of the 
middle class (ADB, 2010). This limit has led other authors to use a lower 
limit of $ 10. The criteria $ 10- $ 20, $ 10- $ 50 or $ 10- $ 100 are nowadays 
frequently used. The mixed approach consists of combining an absolute 
lower bound and a relative upper bound. Birdsall (2010) has suggested a 
lower bound of $ 10 and an upper bound corresponding to the 95th 
percentile of the income distribution: she considers that this upper limit 
makes it possible to exclude from the middle class households or 
individuals whose income is essentially derived from wealth. 
3.1.2. Second stage: classification procedure and group characterization 
In order to study the composition of the middle class in detail, we will 
first consider an income criterion allowing us to isolate a ‘middle-income 
set’ based on a strictly monetary indicator. The income considered here is 
the per capita monthly income of the household, considered exhaustively 
(formal and informal earned income, wealth income, public and private 
transfers, etc.)4. In this case, we have chosen the monetary range from US $ 
10 PPP per person per day to the 95th percentile of the income distribution 
for Turkey. It excludes the poor in the context of an emerging country 
(Kharas, 2010) while, according to Birdsall (2010: 7), the upper relative limit 
excludes “that portion of the population within a country whose income is 
most likely to be from inherited wealth or based on prior or current 
economic rents (…) and thus less associated with productive and primarily 
labour activity than for the non-rich”. This criterion makes it possible to 
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isolate a ‘middle-income class’ representing 75.4% of Turkish households in 
2014. 
In order to explore the heterogeneity of this ‘middle-income class’ from 
a multidimensional point of view, we apply a mixed classification 
procedure using several variables describing the occupational and 
educational status of households in the sample under consideration. This 
improves and expands the purely income-based approach by considering 
the chief focus of the sociological literature on class structure (see 
Bonnefond et al., 2015, p.45-46). More specifically, after analyzing the 
survey questionnaires, we selected and recoded five variables related to the 
education and employment of the household head to implement the 
classification: (i) the highest level of education attained, (ii) the socio-
professional category, (iii) the employment status, (iv) the type of employer 
or institutional sector and (v) the possible multi-activity of the household 
head5.  
Based on these five variables, the selected procedure performs a 
classification of a large set of individuals characterized by their first 
factorial coordinates created by an initial factor analysis procedure (here a 
multiple correspondence analysis carried out on the five variables). A first 
classification is obtained by comparing several basic partitions built around 
mobile centers, before the stable classes thus formed are aggregated by a 
hierarchical classification method. Ward’s aggregation criterion is used. 
The selected partition (the number of groups retained within the 
middle-income class) results from the analysis of the values of the 
aggregation nodes and the analysis of the dendrogram (the diagram that 
synthetizes the successive aggregation stages). Its robustness is controlled 
by the analysis of two indicators that respectively (i) maximise the marginal 
improvement of the between to within-cluster variance ratio from one 
partition to another and (ii) minimise the effect of k-means clustering on 
that ratio. Based on these criteria, we propose a classification into 
homogeneous, clearly distinct groups. Finally, in order to characterize them 
as well as possible, we compare the distributions of the different 
classification variables mentioned above from one group to another and 
refine the analysis by comparing the distributions or the averages of a 
further set of variables, called characterization variables. 
 
3.2. ‘Monetary’ Identification of the Turkish middle class 
The quantitative analysis is carried out using SILC (Survey on Income and 
Life Conditions) survey data collected by Turkstat (Turkish Statistical 
Institute). The baseline survey year is 2014 and the survey covers 
approximately 23,000 households. Figure 1 shows the monthly per capita 
income distribution of Turkish households in 2014, as well as the position 
of the thresholds used to identify the middle-income class. We see that this 
distribution is right-skewed because of large income inequalities and that 
the ‘poverty line’ of 10 dollars PPP per day per capita is very close to the 
modal value of the distribution. 
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Figure 1. Monthly per capita household income (Kernel density function, Turkey, 2014). 
 
Starting from this income distribution, we measure the size of the 
middle class on the basis of a set of intervals used in the literature. The 
weights of the different groups (poor, middle class, rich) for Turkey, for 11 
different intervals, are reported in Table 1. The different criteria used 
produce very disparate results in terms of the percentage of the middle 
class in the overall population, ranging from 21 to 77% for the year 2014. 
This is explained by the variety of intervals which, in many cases, overlap 
only very partially, if at all. This great disparity obviously raises the 
problem of the choice of the most relevant criterion. It seems imperative to 
select a lower bound that is neither too low (at the risk of capturing 
households that are much more ‘poor’ than ‘middle class’), nor too high (in 
order to be able to include households that are certainly not poor, but 
which would remain potentially vulnerable to a return to poverty). We 
have used the range of $ 10 per day to the 95th percentile of the distribution 
for the rest of the analysis. It identifies three-quarters of Turkish 
households as belonging to the middle-income class. This result gives the 
middle class a slightly higher weight than the estimates produced by other 
recent studies (see II.2). 
 
Table 1. Middle class size according to different income criteria (Turkey, 2014) 
Criterion Income range Poor Middle class Rich 
 
Monthly per capita 
TRY Monthly per capita $ (%) (%) (%) 
  (2014 prices) (PPP 2011, 2014 prices)       
  
 
        
[$2; $10] [TRY70; TRY349] [$60; $300] 0.2 21.3 78.4 
[$2; $20] [TRY70; TRY698] [$60; $600] 0.2 53.7 46.1 
[$4; $20] [TRY140; TRY698] [$120; $600] 2.7 51.2 46.1 
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Table 1. Middle class size according to different income criteria (Turkey, 2014).  
(Continue) 
Criterion Income range Poor Middle class Rich 
 
Monthly per capita 
TRY Monthly per capita $ (%) (%) (%) 
  (2014 prices) (PPP 2011, 2014 prices)       
[$10; $20] [TRY349; TRY698] [$300; $600] 21.6 32.4 46.1 
[$10; $50] [TRY349; TRY1,745] [$300, $1,500] 21.6 68.7 9.7 
[$10; $100] [TRY349; TRY3,489] [$300; $3,000] 21.6 76.8 1.7 
   
   
[75%-125% median income] [TRY487; TRY811] [$419; $698] 35.5 26.6 37.9 
[50%-150% median income] [TRY324; TRY973] [$279; $837] 18.9 52.2 28.9 
[100%-250% mean income] [TRY876; TRY2,191] [$754; $1,884] 66.0 28.1 5.9 
 
 
 
   
[$10; P90] [TRY349; TRY1,719] [$300; $1,478] 21.6 68.4 10.0 
[$10; P95] [TRY349; TRY2,319] [$300; $1,994] 21.6 75.4 5.0 
            
Note: PPP conversion coefficient (PPP 2011 adjusted to 2014 prices) = 1.163 (Source: World 
Bank). Source: SILC (2014). 
 
In the next step we characterize the three groups initially identified on 
the basis of this income criterion: ‘poor’, ‘middle class’ and ‘rich’, by the 
various selected classification variables (Table 2). These classification 
variables are those that will allow us, in a second stage, to better 
understand the diversity of this ‘monetarily-defined’ middle class by 
simultaneously considering the occupational and educational status of 
households. 
 
Table 2. Characteristics (classification variables) of household heads belonging to poor, 
middle class and rich categories (Turkey, 2014). 
  Poor Middle class Rich Whole population 
Education 
    No education 14.9 8.2 1.1 9.3 
Primary education 62.9 47.9 14.0 49.4 
Secondary education 21.0 29.2 20.0 27.0 
Tertiary education 1.1 14.7 64.9 14.3 
Occupation     
No job (retiree, inactive, unemployed) 32.9 39.2 24.5 37.1 
Managers, executives 2.0 10.0 52.2 10.4 
Intermediate occupations 1.4 7.3 9.0 6.1 
Service employees 24.6 19.9 9.1 20.3 
Workers 22.2 13.5 1.4 14.8 
Farmers 17.0 10.1 3.9 11.3 
Employment status     
No job (retiree, inactive, unemployed) 32.9 39.2 24.5 37.1 
Paid employees 42.9 40.7 51.4 41.7 
Self-employed without employees 22.6 15.8 8.1 16.9 
Self-employed with employees 1.2 3.7 15.9 3.8 
Unpaid workers 0.5 0.6 0.1 0.6 
Institutional sector     
No job (retiree, inactive, unemployed) 32.9 39.2 24.5 37.1 
Formal employment 32.9 44.0 65.8 42.7 
Informal employment 34.2 16.7 9.7 20.2 
Households head with >1 activity     
Yes 6.2 5.3 5.3 5.5 
No 93.8 94.7 94.7 94.5 
Note: The middle class is defined as households whose per capita daily income ranges from $10 to the 
95th percentile of income distribution. Source: SILC (2014). 
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Table 2 clearly shows the extent to which the Turkish middle-income 
class differs from the others. We see that it is mostly in an intermediate 
position between rich and poor, but that in some respects it approaches the 
poorest (employment status, education) and in others the richest 
(institutional sector). However, it is obviously of particular interest to 
question the diversity of situations within the class itself. 
 
3.3. Typology and characterization of the Turkish middle class 
We then isolate households belonging to the middle-income class (about 
17,000 of the 23,000 households in the SILC dataset) and investigate its 
heterogeneity by carrying out the multidimensional classification 
procedure described above. The results of this classification lead us to 
identify four distinct groups within the middle Turkish income class. Based 
on the analysis of the comparative distributions of the classification 
variables and a set of characterization variables (Table 3 and Table A.1), we 
can describe these four groups, i.e. these four ‘middle classes’ identified 
separately in Turkey in 2014. 
 
Table 3. Characteristics of clusters (classification variables) derived from the mixed 
classification procedure* (Turkey, 2014). 
  Group 1 Group 2 Group 3 Group 4 Whole 
  (39%) (13%) (31%) (17%)  population 
Education 
     No education 17.7 6.3 1.5 0.0 8.2 
Primary education 54.9 73.6 48.8 10.6 47.9 
Secondary education 21.0 17.7 41.8 34.0 29.2 
Tertiary education 6.5 2.3 8.0 55.4 14.7 
Occupation      
No job (retiree, inactive, unemployed) 100.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 39.2 
Managers, executives 0.0 2.2 0.1 56.7 10.0 
Intermediate occupations 0.0 0.9 0.0 42.3 7.3 
Service employees 0.0 13.9 58.3 0.5 19.9 
Workers 0.0 6.6 41.0 0.0 13.5 
Farmers 0.0 76.4 0.6 0.4 10.1 
Employment status      
No job (retiree, inactive, unemployed) 100.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 39.2 
Paid employees 0.0 2.4 84.3 84.1 40.7 
Self-employed without employees 0.0 92.4 9.6 5.4 15.8 
Self-employed with employees 0.0 2.8 5.2 10.2 3.7 
Unpaid workers 0.0 2.4 0.9 0.4 0.6 
Institutional sector      
No job (retiree, inactive, unemployed) 100.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 39.2 
Formal employment 0.0 18.3 82.9 94.5 44.0 
Informal employment 0.0 81.7 17.1 5.6 16.7 
Household head with >1 activity      
Yes 0.0 12.3 8.9 5.7 5.3 
No 100.0 87.7 91.1 94.3 94.7 
(*) The shaded cells identify the categories that are statistically (at the 5% level) better 
represented in the group considered than in the rest of the middle class. 
Source: SILC (2014). 
 
Retired and inactive middle class (group 1 - 39% of the middle-income 
class). This group consists mainly of households headed by retirees, who 
are also generally less well-educated than other middle-class heads of 
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households. There are far more female heads of household than in the other 
groups. These households are, more often than the others, owners of their 
(relatively small and poorly-equipped) dwellings and are distinguished by 
a subjective state of health worse than that of the other groups and by a 
lower appetite than the others for leisure and the Internet. They are 
relatively small households whose incomes are comparable to those of the 
entire middle class. 
Farmers’ middle class (group 2-13%). This group consists 
overwhelmingly of self-employed and some unpaid workers. Most of them 
are farmers in informal employment, in the sense of non-registration of the 
activity with social security institutions. The heads of these households 
only have, for the most part, a primary level of education and they are 
more likely than the others to have more than one activity. They are, for the 
most part, owners of their homes, however, these are less well-equipped 
than average, their incomes are rather low compared to the average and 
they are on average older than other heads of households (excluding group 
1). They are slightly over-represented in the Black Sea and Eastern Anatolia 
regions and, like the previous group, have neither the means nor the 
appetite to indulge in recreation or use the Internet. 
Industry and service workers and small entrepreneurs’ middle class 
(group 3-31%). This group of households is mainly made up of service 
industry employees and industrial workers who are wage earners in the 
formal economy, but it also includes three-quarters of the urban self-
employed and nearly half of urban employers. The heads of these 
households sometimes have more than one activity and are more likely 
than the others to have completed secondary education. They are more 
likely than the others to be tenants of their dwellings or to occupy them 
rent-free. Many heads of these households work in factories, businesses or 
construction, public administration and defense. Two-thirds of them show 
a good subjective state of health, but many lack the means to pay for 
regular leisure activities or an Internet connection at home. This group has 
the lowest average monthly per capita income of the entire middle class. 
The heads of these households are younger and their dwellings are better-
equipped than those of the two preceding classes. 
Employers and executives’ upper middle class (group 4-17%). This 
group of households is mainly composed of managers, employers and 
intermediate occupations in the formal sector, whose level of education is 
globally very high. Often tenants of their dwellings, these households 
display a very good subjective state of health. They mainly work in the 
sectors of information and communication, finance and insurance, real 
estate, scientific and technical activities and education. They have more 
regular leisure time than most others, they are very much connected to the 
Internet at home and over 60% of them can afford at least one week's 
annual vacation. They are also far more likely than the others to say that 
their incomes allow them to make ends meet easily. They have the largest 
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and best-equipped homes, are relatively young compared to the others, and 
have the highest income level of all the groups identified. 
The four middle classes thus identified and characterized from the strict 
point of view of the selected variables make it possible to formalize, in a 
multidimensional way, the diversity and ‘divides’ existing within the 
middle-income class in Turkey. The proposed quantitative approach echoes 
the elements identified earlier in the literature and confirms them in several 
respects. Thus, we advance and support the idea that most of groups 1 and 
4 members (retirees and upper middle-class employers and executives) 
could be considered as the Turkish ‘old middle classes’ who are losing 
ground, and that groups 2 and 3 identify themselves quite clearly with the 
‘new middle classes’ that have been emerging since the early 2000s in 
urban areas (industry and service workers, small entrepreneurs) and in 
rural areas (farmers)6. The second set of households appears to be a flow of 
households ‘extracted’ from poverty since the end of the 1990s, in line with 
the growth of the export-oriented manufacturing sector. Recent political 
power has supported the emergence of this ‘new’ middle class through 
anti-poverty policies, but has not implemented policies explicitly dedicated 
to maintaining and sustaining a stock of pre-existing middle class 
households. 
 
4. Using qualitative analysis to enrich the quantitative 
conclusions 
The quantitative results presented above can very usefully be 
complemented by a systematic analysis of the behavior and aspirations of 
the middle class members from semi-structured qualitative interviews. 
These interviews were conducted on the basis of an interview guide 
adapted to the specific characteristics of Turkey and to a population chosen 
to cover all the different middle classes ‘identified’ by quantitative analysis. 
Respondents were surveyed in Istanbul and Gaziantep to capture – as well 
as possible, and in two very different areas of the country – the diversity 
identified in the middle-income class during the previous stage. The 
interviews aim to provide deeper knowledge of the middle class in terms of 
their economic aspirations, their professional and intergenerational 
mobility, their access to capital, public services and opportunities, their 
participation in social life, their inclusion in social networks, their demands 
for social protection, their environmental aspirations and their political 
preferences and aspirations7. 
 
4.1. General characteristics of the respondents 
As regards demographic characteristics, the interviews show above all 
the remarkable fall in the birth rate among the middle classes over the last 
thirty years. Like the entire population of the country, all the interviewees 
had at least two children fewer than their parents. More specifically, it is 
clear that young middle-class couples have significantly fewer children 
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than those of the previous generation, especially in Istanbul. Another 
demographic feature is that the age of marriage of younger generations is 
later than previous generations, also especially in Istanbul. Finally, it 
should be noted that the rather rapid aging process of the Turkish 
population increases the number of single elderly people. They often live in 
difficult material conditions and only belong to the middle class thanks to 
the support of their children who have experienced some social 
advancement (e.g. n°14 and n° 17). 
The educational levels of our interviewees ranged from primary school 
to university and they are particularly well correlated with the socio-
economic status of individuals. Interviewees with the lowest levels of 
education are also usually the oldest, which reflects the massive increase in 
enrollment rates in recent years. Exceptions to this rule include relatively 
young individuals pursuing the ‘traditional’ activity of their parents (n°15, 
for example) or women from small villages with conservative opinions 
(n°18). For those interviewees who are employees and tendtobelong to the 
“old” middle classes as defined above, the level of education is the most 
discriminating factor as regards their socio-economic position. For the 
others, who tend to belong to the “new” middle classes, the correlation 
between the level of education and income is also apparent although less 
marked. In addition, the effects of social progress appear to be at work 
among the middle classes, since none of the interviewees have a lower level 
of education than their parents. However, there is a general feeling that the 
recognized value of diplomas is decreasing, which is linked to the 
generalization and greater ease of access to secondary and higher 
education. 
By looking at the professional situation of our interviewees, we can 
clearly distinguish three main categories: employees, the inactive (retired 
and homemakers) and ‘small entrepreneurs’ (employers and self-
employed). The ‘lower’ segment of the middle classes is more likely to be 
blue-collar or white-collar workers with fragile status, low pay and most of 
the time without any job security. Gaziantep subcontracted workers, aged 
29 and 31, earning around 2,500 TRY per month (n°5 and n°8) are good 
examples of this precarious segment, as is the 39-year-old woman working 
for 2,000 TRY per month in a hairdressing salon in Istanbul (n°13). During 
interviews, we also found that employees and retirees formed two 
fundamental subsets, defining the identity of the Turkish middle classes. 
While education and social capital are decisive for both income and class 
positioning, there is a significant difference among pensioners between 
those in the public sector (EmekliSandığı) and those in the private sector 
(SSK, Bağ-Kur). We have seen that some retirees, especially in the public 
service, were in a relatively comfortable situation and that they owed that 
to two forms of investment made during their period of work: housing and 
education. In the retiree sub-group, being a homeowner directly 
determines the position within the middle class. On the one hand, ‘fragile’ 
pensioners are obliged to pay rent with their small pension and on the 
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other hand, ‘protected’ pensioners live in housing that they own and 
position themselves in the upper middle class segment. Similarly, among 
retirees, those who were able, when they were active, to invest a large part 
of their income in the education of their children are now reaping the 
benefits of their ‘investments’. Indeed, it appears that children who, thanks 
to their high level of education, work for a relatively high salary, offer 
material support to their parents. The subgroups least likely to talk about 
their income in detail are the tradesmen, self-employed artisans, and small 
entrepreneurs. Generally, they are also the group whose world view is the 
most conservative and traditional in terms of the distribution of social roles 
between sexes or between generations. 
 
4.2. Changes in living conditions between generations 
The interviews revealed a fairly high level of intergenerational social 
mobility, especially in Istanbul. It appears that there are three ways that 
interviewees rise up the social scalecompared to their parents in terms of 
education, income and standard of living. The first involves spatial 
mobility and the transition from a rural to an urban setting, especially for 
interviewees from Istanbul. This transition has often been carried out in 
several stages: firstly, the newly urban households have solved their 
housing and work problems by resorting to mutual assistance, helped by 
bonds of common geographical origin or family ties. By accepting 
precarious and low-wage jobs, they were able to make initial savings in 
order to become owners, often of self-built housing (gecekondu) and to 
provide education for their children. In this way, the second generation 
was able to rise to a higher socio-economic position than that of their 
parents. During this process, the links of common origin, abundantly 
mobilized by the parents’ generation, have lost their importance. For 
example, among the interviewees in Istanbul, only one said that they 
belonged to a ‘country’ association (n°15). However, it must be emphasized 
that the transition from a rural to an urban setting does not always involve 
a complete break with the former. This is particularly true for a city such as 
Gaziantep whose hinterland is characterized by intense agricultural 
activity. The urban middle classes in Gaziantep have not broken with the 
villages and small towns whence they come. Some people who live in the 
city actually continue to farm in their home village. Despite recurring talk 
of the death of agriculture, new urban dwellers have not abandoned it and 
sometimes even earn most of their income by pursuing an agricultural 
activity often intended for consumption by their families. As related in 
several of the interviews conducted in Gaziantep, the preservation of a link 
with the village of origin provides resources that are still important in 
coping with the economic difficulties inherent incity life (n°7, n°9, n°10). 
Even households with higher incomes are still marked in their way of life, 
their valuesand their systems of standards by the rural world from which 
they come and which they tend to perpetuate in the city. The second lever 
of social mobility is education, whose benefits are, in fact, linked to the first 
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lever –rural-urban transition – since education is the main catalyst of social 
change and modernization in Turkey. The fact that almost all of our 
interviewees insisted that they gave primary importance to education 
demonstrates thisclearly: the middle classes firmly believe in the principle 
‘If you study, you will have a better life’, whose validity they have 
experienced in their own lives, whether they have succeeded or not. For 
them, ‘better education’ means ‘a better job’, in other words ‘better income 
to live better’. Indeed, although the Turkish education system is far from 
perfect and today the fact of having a degree no longer offers an absolute 
guarantee, given the substantial influx of graduates onto the job market, we 
found that no interviewee really questioned the validity of the close 
relationship between education and social mobility. The third way to 
ensure social mobility, even if it is less widespread and more random, is 
marriage. As we were told explicitly, women in particular can experience 
immediate social mobility by marrying a man who is richer and more 
educated than them (n°18, n°19, n°20 and n°25). This mode of social 
mobility, even if it is uncertain and often hazardous, is recognized as one of 
the rare opportunities for urban settlement and social advancement offered 
to women in rural areas. 
Urbanization and social mobility mean, one way or another, adaptation 
to life in large cities and to the dominant national culture. In the 
biographical narrative they supplied, some of the interviewees provided 
information on forms of voluntary assimilation experienced by their 
parents of various ethnic origins after having ‘immigrated’ to Istanbul. The 
life stories of three of our interviewees are edifying in this respect, two of 
Arab origin (n°12 and n°13) and one of Bosnian origin (n°16). All three 
spoke of the connection between the immigration to Istanbul of these 
people from different ethnic groups, their social mobility and their 
‘Turkification’. During this process of social change, education and 
occupation play a central role. For example, the state civil service seems to 
have played the same integrating role as the devşirme under the Ottoman 
Empire, leading to ‘Turkification’ by a relativisation of ethnic and cultural 
allegiances specific to the family environment. However, each family 
experienced this process of ‘becoming Turkish’in its own way and at its 
own pace. Thus, for a 67-year-old woman born and raised in Istanbul, but 
from parents of Arab origin (department of Siirt), assimilation did not 
prevent her from proudly referring to her origins in her dietary or domestic 
practices (n°12). Another woman (n°14), a 71-year-old widow, however, 
told us that she had ‘forgotten’ her Arab and Kurdish origins over the 
years. These women are also very keen on the Turkish modernizing 
progressivism that they have made their own. 
 
4.3. Socio-economic behavior of the families interviewed 
Contrary to the view held by many experts and institutions on the 
alleged conspicuous consumption behavior of the middle classes, 
household interviews revealed rather modest behavior in terms of 
F. Combarnous et al., TER, 6(3), 2019, p.158-184. 
174 
 
Turkish Economic Review 
expenditure. Consumption patterns were expected to be different between 
the four middle classes. However, the consumption practices of all 
interviewees appeared to be rather frugal and economical, since most of 
their expenditure was on food and they were careful to limit it. For 
example, interviewees who had not broken their regular links to the 
countryside, especially in Gaziantep, made an effort to reduce their food 
expenditure in the city by obtaining provisions from the villages (n°5, n°7, 
n°8, n°9, n°10). In addition to food and clothing, the few interviewees who 
spoke about vacations and travel were relatively well-off retirees and 
educated employees with higher than average incomes (n°3, n°12, n°21, 
n°23, n°24). Social role also seems to be closely related toexpenditure, in the 
sense that men are almost always responsible for any major expenditure, 
whatever its purpose. Most of the households interviewed try to save, by 
hoarding for the least well off, by buying a house or land or by subscribing 
to an individual retirement plan (n°11, n°13, n°23, n°24, n°25), or even by 
investing in the stock market or other funds (n°13 and n°21). 
As far as indebtedness among the Turkish middle classes is concerned, 
first of all the use of credit cardshas become generalized. The increasing use 
of credit cards (revolving credit and/or cash reserves) in Turkey, whose 
fundamental characteristic is to increase ‘expendable’ income, has ensured 
the self-financing of households marked by a history of very high inflation. 
Indeed, for most of the interviewees the credit card is essential:  
‘We are all in the same situation: we borrow, we have credit cards, we are full 
of debts. We do not stop paying off our debts; we repay again and again. This 
is the picture. Everyone, from the most modest to the wealthiest, without 
exception, everyone is in debt ‘(n°15).  
This method of financing consumer spending seems to be largely 
favored by the middle classes. With regard to the use of bank credit – 
another dimension of middle-class indebtedness – the interviewees have 
very different attitudes. The oldest people are generally characterized by 
very strong reservations and apprehensions about indebtedness and credit 
(n°2, n°9, n°12, n°22, etc.). In this case, the lack of information about how 
credit works seems strongly linked to a rather low level of education. Other 
people only borrow exceptionally, for large purchases (house, car), but 
evoke fears related to the instability of interest rates. The last group reveals 
the existence of middle-class households living in a permanent spiral of 
debt and for whom borrowing is the only strategy for survival or the 
maintenance of a certain level of consumption (n°1, n°4, n°6, n°11, n°15, 
etc.). Members of the middle-class make a clear distinction between 
creditused to acquire durable goods and housing, considered as a form of 
saving, and other credit, described as ‘that used bypeople who cannot spend 
without going into debt’and considered as an indication of economic 
weakness. 
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4.4. Participation in social and political life 
In the households where we conducted our interviews, ‘free time’ 
activities were almost non-existent, with only a few interviewees referring 
to trips or visits to family members outside the city of residence or sports 
activities. Overall, the life of the middle classes is divided between home 
and work. Children are at the center of life. Expenses, savings, the use of 
free time or plans for the future all revolve around children. The social and 
political life of the interviewees also seems rather limited. Only three 
people were members of a political party or association of 
regional/immigrant compatriots (n°13, n°15, n°18). 
The absence of social and political life and the relative lack of 
participation in public activities reflect the fact that the home is the most 
important space in the life of the Turkish middle classes. Women clearly 
occupy a key position within this domestic space. From our interviews 
there is a generalizedfeeling of boredom and confinement among middle-
class women. There is still strong pressure on women – from both their 
family and the social environment in which they find themselves –about 
whether or not to continue their education on the one hand and on the 
issue of marriage on the other hand. We found during the interviews that 
arranged marriages and early marriages were still common practice, 
especially in families of rural origin. When women were working before 
getting married, it was their husbands who made the decision about 
whether the women could continue to work after marriage. In this sense, 
the decision as to whether a woman works or not often seems to be the sole 
responsibility of husbands and families. However, there is ambivalence 
about whether women should do paid work outside the house. In the lower 
segments of the middle classes, women's work is considered a necessity. In 
low-income households, the search for extra income for the family explains 
the fact that both parents work, especially in Istanbul. As suggested 
implicitly by some interviewees, the opinion that‘if the husband's income is 
correct, he will not make his wife work’predominates. In the upper middle-
class segments, on the other hand, women who graduate from universities 
consider that professional life is necessary for self-fulfillment (n°23). 
Because of the pressures they experienced during their childhood and 
youth, women are inclined to have a more liberal approach to educating 
their own children. This change in the standards of child education is one 
of the markers of the growing influence of women in middle-class families 
in today's Turkey. It is also expressed through a relative rebalancing of how 
domestic tasks are shared in the households where men and women are 
active. Patriarchal behavior, however, remains very pronounced among 
older households, small tradesmen, craftsmenand farmers. Finally, care 
and supervision of dependent individuals, traditionally provided by 
women, tend to be outsourced by the middle classes. Middle class 
households are increasingly resorting to the paid services of a live-in carer. 
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5. Conclusion: specific characteristics and internal 
differentiation of the Turkish middle class 
Globally speaking, the Turkish middle class has a number of specific 
aspirations that distinguish it from the rest of society. Among them, home 
ownership is a very important distinction, especially in large cities where 
rents are high. In both Gaziantep and Istanbul, home ownership is the 
greatest aspiration of tenant households. According to the TÜİK (2016) 
survey on consumer spending, households spend most of their budget on 
housing and rent. In times of economic hardship being a homeowner is 
thus an important source of income for households. The homebuying 
process is a buffer mechanism that reduces the fragility of some middle 
class households. Similarly, the demand for security, especially housing, is 
a good marker of middle class membership –whatever the family’s 
ideological persuasions. Car ownership is also a clear marker of middle 
class membership, irrespective of how much the vehicle is used. Sending 
children to private schools is also tending to become widespread as a 
distinctive sign of middle class membership, especially among couples 
with young children. Access to private health insurance systems is another 
discriminating feature, although reserved for the upper middle class 
segment. The possession of ‘high-tech’ devices is not so much a distinctive 
element of the middle class as their use (time spenton the Internet and 
ability to ‘understand’ and use digital technologies). The final distinctive 
element is taking vacations. Whether returning to their place of origin, 
visiting a family member, or staying at a seaside hotel or abroad, vacations 
are a distinctive feature of belonging to the middle class who can generally 
afford this type of expenditure. It should be noted, however, that in overall 
terms, the Turkish middle classes appear quite fragile and vulnerable. 
‘Compelled’ to display their membership of the middle class by some 
forms of more or less conspicuous consumption, they are often identified as 
the ‘indebted classes’ or as the ‘middle classes on credit’. They can be 
considered to be more clearly positioned at the acquisition stage 
(‘consumer mentality’) than at the conservation stage that characterizes the 
more established middle classes. 
The internal differentiation within the middle classes in Turkey, is 
frequently suggested to be‘secular’ vs ‘conservative’ (Yılmaz, 2007). For 
example, Rankin et al. (2013) identify a group of ‘engaged provincialists’, 
who are taking a critical stance with respect to the emerging global culture 
and advocating traditional, conservative values. According to these 
authors, 30% to 40% of the national population is associated with average 
income and education and support for the role of religion in public life. 
This model could be very widespread among the new Islamic middle class. 
The ‘secular’vs‘conservative’divide broadly corresponds with the 
distinction made above in our quantitative approach between groups 1 and 
4 (retired and upper middle class employers and executives) on the one 
hand and groups 2 and 3 (industry and service workers, small 
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entrepreneurs and farmers) on the other. Our interviews, however, led us 
to identify two different dynamics in the subset of “conservative” middle 
classes. The first tends to produce middle classes that are on the fast track 
of changeand modernization. Such change is initiated through 
consumption patterns, but then quickly affects the ‘world view’, for those 
with a high level of education and even for some of the others. The other 
dynamic at work in this group is that of strengthening the conservative 
identity. These households want religious values to extend to all areas of 
social life. This ‘conservative-religious’ dynamic, however, does not seem 
to concern many households when compared to those following a path of 
change and individualization. 
One of the salient features of today's Turkish middle class is 
undoubtedly its strong political polarization. There is such a division that 
the interviewees, depending on their political position, strongly applaud or 
criticize developments in recent years in such important areas as education, 
health, social security, taxes, corruption and security of property and 
people. The cleavage between the secular ‘old middle classes’ and the 
conservative ‘new middle classes’ appears to be particularly profound in 
this respect, for example with regard to taxation, educational reforms and 
corruption problems. 
In fact, to understand the Turkish middle class and its role in the 
country's economic, social and political dynamics it is necessary to go 
beyond a definition limited to a statistical group of ‘neither rich nor 
poor’households. The approach proposed in this paper aims to reveal all 
the complexity and diversity of the households comprising this set of 
‘people in the middle’. Our multidimensional quantitative measurements, 
supplemented by qualitative interviews, reveal significant diversity 
coupled with strong polarization within the Turkish middle class. These 
factors will obviously affect the ways in which the middle class is likely to 
influence the economic, social and political dynamics, particularly through 
the structure of consumption, private and public investment in education, 
the expansion of the formal wage system, the development of social 
protection and the consolidation of democracy. Even more than its size, it is 
nevertheless the structure of the middle class and its homogeneity that 
probably have the most significant effects on the development of economic 
and social regulation practices in developing countries (Acemoglu & 
Robinson, 2006). Thus, the obvious lack of homogeneity in the behavior 
and aspirations of the middle class is likely to limit the expected positive 
effects of the emergence of a homogeneous middle class in Turkey. 
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Notes 
1  The "Gezi uprising" protest movement began on May 28, 2013 in Istanbul and was 
compared in terms of its scale and the nature of its demands to the "Arab Spring". The 
protests spread to other cities across the country with anti-government claims from 
various backgrounds. 
2 Since 1990, and even more so since 2000, there has been a proliferation of gated 
communities on the edge of large cities (closed and secure estates offering almost total 
privatization of institutions and services), which is one of the symbols of the presence of 
middle class in the city (Pérouse, 2004; Pérouse & Danış, 2005). 
3 Kemalism is the founding ideology of the Republic of Turkey. As it was implemented by 
Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, it was defined by sweeping political, social, cultural and religious 
reforms designed to separate the new Turkish state from its Ottoman predecessor and 
embrace a Westernized way of living, including the establishment of democracy, 
secularism, state support of the sciences and free education, many of which were first 
introduced to Turkey during Atatürk's presidency in his reforms. 
4 Monthly income has been computed from an annual measurement in order to avoid the 
impact of the irregular nature of income receipt from economic activities such as 
construction and agriculture. 
5 It should be noted that the choice of these variables was also constrained by the need to 
ensure the comparative scope of the results insofar as this work is part of a broader 
comparative study on Brazil, Côte d’Ivoire, Turkey and Vietnam. 
6 The "old" and "new" middle class terminology is, however, debatable. Indeed, Group 4 is 
also often described by Turkish researchers as "new middle class" because of its strong 
international connections and its high level of income and consumption. It must also be 
emphasized that in Turkish scientific literature "new" also means Western, Westernist, or 
Westernized. 
7 The methodological details of the qualitative approach are reported in Appendix A.2. The 
authors warmly thank DidemAsliDanis (University of Galatasaray), BurakGürbüz 
(University of Gaziantep) and Jean-François Pérouse (French Institute of Anatolian 
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Appendices 
 
Table A.1. Characteristics of clusters (characterization variables) derived from the mixed 
classification procedure* (Turkey, 2014). 
  Group 1 Group 2 Group 3 Group 4 Whole 
  (39%) (13%) (31%) (17%) population 
          
Household head main economic activity  
    No job (retiree, inactive, unemployed) 100,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 39,2 
Agriculture, forestry, hunting and fishing 0,0 75,9 2,3 0,8 10,6 
Mining and quarrying 0,0 0,0 1,5 0,8 0,6 
Manufacturing 0,0 2,9 25,1 13,7 10,5 
Electricity, gas, steam, water supply, sewerage etc. 0,0 0,6 1,1 1,6 0,7 
Construction 0,0 1,9 11,8 3,7 4,5 
Whole-sale and retail trade 0,0 9,3 17,4 9,7 8,2 
Transportation and storage 0,0 3,6 9,0 3,8 3,9 
Accommodation and food service activities 0,0 1,7 6,3 4,3 2,9 
Information and communication 0,0 0,2 0,2 1,9 0,4 
Financial and insurance activities 0,0 0,1 0,3 2,3 0,5 
Real estate activities 0,0 0,1 0,0 1,1 0,2 
Professional, scientific and technical activities 0,0 0,1 0,3 4,6 0,9 
Administrative and support service activities 0,0 1,0 7,2 1,8 2,7 
Public administration and defense 0,0 0,0 10,0 19,2 6,4 
Education 0,0 0,1 2,0 19,8 4,0 
Human health and social work activities 0,0 0,0 2,1 5,7 1,6 
Arts, entertainment and recreation 0,0 0,4 0,3 0,8 0,3 
Other social, community and personal services 0,0 2,1 3,0 4,4 1,9 
Region  
    Istanbul 9,5 2,7 12,2 11,7 9,9 
Marmara 17,5 18,8 19,2 15,5 17,8 
Aegean 15,6 18,8 15,8 14,0 15,8 
Ankara 5,9 2,6 6,5 8,2 6,1 
Central Anatolia 11,0 10,8 10,8 10,4 10,8 
Mediterranean 13,0 10,3 11,4 10,9 11,8 
Black Sea 14,3 19,9 11,5 11,9 13,7 
East Anatolia 7,9 11,7 7,2 10,5 8,6 
South Anatolia 5,4 4,4 5,5 6,8 5,5 
Gender  
    Male 63,3 92,7 94,9 93,4 82,0 
Female 36,7 7,3 5,1 6,6 18,0 
Tenure status  
    Owner 73,6 79,2 49,9 49,0 62,8 
Tenant 13,5 7,1 27,5 30,1 19,8 
Lodging 0,2 0,2 2,5 7,0 2,1 
Other (rent-free accommodation) 12,7 13,5 20,1 14,0 15,3 
Household can afford to pay for leisure regularly  
    Yes 7,7 4,8 14,7 38,2 14,7 
No, cannot afford it 11,9 10,9 18,6 7,7 13,1 
No, other reason 80,4 84,3 66,8 54,1 72,2 
Internet connection  
    Yes 24,4 17,8 47,3 76,6 39,5 
No, cannot afford it 12,5 15,7 18,1 5,2 13,4 
No, other reason 63,1 66,5 34,5 18,2 47,1 
Household can afford to pay for annual holiday  
    Yes 29,1 31,6 30,2 61,5 35,3 
No 70,9 68,4 69,8 38,5 64,7 
Ability to "make ends meet" with total monthly 
income  
    With great difficulty 10,4 6,8 8,9 3,7 8,3 
With difficulty 31,4 27,8 31,6 18,5 28,8 
With some difficulty 39,1 32,5 35,6 35,9 36,6 
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Table A.1. Characteristics of clusters (characterization variables) derived from the mixed 
classification procedure* (Turkey, 2014). 
(Continue) 
  Group 1 Group 2 Group 3 Group 4 Whole 
  (39%) (13%) (31%) (17%) population 
Fairly easily 12,9 23,2 17,1 25,7 17,7 
Easily 5,7 9,1 6,4 15,0 8,0 
Very easily 0,6 0,6 0,4 1,2 0,6 
Subjective general health status  
    Very good 2,4 5,7 9,5 14,1 7,0 
Good 33,7 51,3 66,3 70,1 52,2 
Fair 35,6 30,8 18,9 13,3 26,0 
Bad 25,1 11,8 5,1 2,4 13,3 
Very bad 3,2 0,5 0,2 0,2 1,4 
Mean of quantitative variables  
    Household size 2,62 3,52 3,64 3,56 3,21 
Number of rooms available to the household 3,41 3,52 3,49 3,78 3,51 
Size of dwelling 100 103 105 120 105 
Household global monthly income (TRY) 25327 30812 31036 46031 31325 
Per capita monthly income (TRY) 872 805 766 1161 880 
Age of household head 61,7 54,4 41,3 40,3 50,8 
Household asset score (15 items) 10,5 10,2 11,4 12,6 11,1 
       
(*) The shaded cells identify the categories that are statistically (at 5% level) more represented in the 
group considered than in the rest of the middle class. For quantitative variables, shaded (italic) cells 
identify the means that are significantly higher (lower) than those of the whole middle class. 
Source: SILC (2014). 
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A.2. Methodological notes on the qualitative approach 
In situ qualitative interviews were conducted in Istanbul and Gaziantep, 
a large city in the south-east of the country. A total of 25 interviews were 
conducted: 15 in Istanbul and 10 in Gaziantep. According to official census 
figures, Istanbul is the most populous department in Turkey with more 
than 15 million inhabitants, while Gaziantep department, with 2 million 
inhabitants, ranks 8th. Given the population of these two departments, it is 
clear that these 25 in-depth interviews cannot claim to be in any way 
representative, which explains the absence of any quantified elements in 
the comments that follow. However, these interviews provide valuable 
material to help capture the differentiation and nuances that exist between 
the different Turkish middle classes as identified in the previous step. The 
following analysis aims to show these and to try to explain them. The main 
characteristics of the individuals interviewed are shown in the table below. 
 
Table A.2. Main characteristics of the individuals interviewed during qualitative 
household interviews (Turkey, 2017) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Interview 
number Gender Age Region
Urban / 
Rural
Marital 
status
Household 
size Education Occupation
Employment 
status
Household monthly 
global income
1 M 53 Gaziantep U Married 5 Primary Truck driver Employer TRY5,000 (est.) 
2 M 60 Gaziantep U Married 5 Tertiary Retiree Inactive TRY6,000
3 M 46 Gaziantep U Married 5 Tertiary Plumber (wife doctor) Self-employed TRY10,000 (est.) 
4 M 40 Gaziantep U Married 4 Tertiary Manager of family business Employee TRY7,000
5 M 29 Gaziantep U Married 3 Secondary Subcontractor worker Employee TRY2,500 
6 M 34 Gaziantep U Married 3 Tertiary Banker Employee TRY8,000 (est.) 
7 M 62 Gaziantep U / R Married 5 Primary Retiree + farmer Self-employed TRY3,300
8 M 31 Gaziantep U Married 2 Tertiary Subcontractor worker Employee TRY2,350 
9 M 48 Gaziantep R Married 6 Primary Farmer Self-employed TRY3,000 
10 M 75 Gaziantep R Married 13 Primary Retired farmer Inactive TRY2,600 
11 M 49 Istanbul U Married 5 Secondary Civil servant Employee TRY8,800
12 F 66 Istanbul U Married 2 Secondary Housewife Inactive TRY5,000
13 F 39 Istanbul U Single 4 Secondary Haidresser Employee TRY6,000
14 F 81 Istanbul U Widower 1 Primary Housewife Inactive TRY2,500
15 M 38 Istanbul U Single 3 Primary Restaurateur Self-employed TRY6,000
16 F 31 Istanbul U Married 3 Secondary Assistant Accountant Employee TRY3,000
17 F 60 Istanbul U Divorced 1 Secondary Model maker Inactive TRY1,700
18 F 36 Istanbul U Married 4 Primary Housewife Inactive TRY9,000 (est.) 
19 M 66 Istanbul U Married 4 Secondary Owner of a clothing store Self-employed TRY6,000
20 F 50 Istanbul U Married 4 Tertiary Housewife Inactive TRY6,500
21 F 68 Istanbul U Married 2 Tertiary Retired Inactive TRY13,000
22 F 43 Istanbul U Married 4 Secondary Daily Housekeeping Self-employed TRY4,000
23 F 36 Istanbul U Married 3 Tertiary Expert in foreign trade Employee TRY4,000
24 M 34 Istanbul U Single 4 Tertiary Programmer Employee TRY8,000
25 M 31 Istanbul U Married 2 Tertiary Civil servant Employee TRY3,500
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